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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITOR'S NoTa.-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such ac-
tion being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)
BILLS AND NOTES-DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY-DESCRIP-
TION IN SCHEDULE-No. 12,531--Kobebell v. Diers Bros.-
Decided February 3, 1930.
Facts.-Diers Bros. brought suit on a promissory note
against Kobebell and recovered judgment in the lower court.
The defense was that Kobebell had received a discharge in
bankruptcy. In listing a description of this indebtedness in
his bankruptcy petition he describes the note as being owed
to Frank Baker of Scotts Bluffs, Nebraska, and not as being
owed to Diers Bros. It seems that the manager for Diers
Bros. at Scotts Bluffs, Nebaska, was a man by the name of
F. R. Becker that Diers Bros. never had either actual or con-
structive notice of the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings
and never filed any claim therein.
Held.-I. A general assignment of error on the ground
that a motion for new trial has been granted or denied with-
out specifying particular errors will not be considered.
2. Fact findings of a trial court upon conflicting evi-
dence will not be disturbed on review.
3. The attempted description of a promissory note in
the bankrupt's petition was in no respect a compliance with
the Bankruptcy Law and constituted no notice whatsoever to
Diers Bros. and his discharge in bankruptcy did not operate
to discharge him from this particular debt.
Judgment Affirmed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES - AUTOMOBILES - CONVERSION - No.
12,438-Mosko v. Matthews-Decided Feb. 3, 1930.
Facts.-Matthews brought an action in conversion against
Mosko and others to recover the value of an automobile
claimed by Matthews under a foreign chattel mortgage.
Mosko defended on the ground that he was an innocent pur-
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chaser of the automobile for value, and that the mortgage was
not recorded in Colorado.
Held.-l. A chattel mortgage properly executed and
recorded according to the law of the place where the mortgage
is executed and the property is located will, if valid there, be
held valid even as against creditors and purchasers in good
faith in another state to which the property is removed by
the mortgagor unless there is some statute in that state to the
contrary, or unless the transaction contravenes the settled law
or policy of the forum.
2. The validity of the mortgage is determined by the
law of the place where it was made at the time the chattel
was there located.
3. The employment of the rule of comity is conducive
to mutual good-will between states, and is necessary to law in
custom.
4. The old strict rule of pleading and proving statutes
of other states should be relaxed.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-LEADING QUESTIONS-MISCONDUCT
OF JUDGE-No. 12,395-Ewing v. People-Decided Janu-
ary 20, 1930.
Facts.-Ewing was tried and convicted of rape. The
prosecuting witness was a girl fourteen years of age, and the
district attorney asked her leading questions. In the examina-
tion, the attorney for the defendant objected to an answer on
the ground that it was prejudicial and the Judge, in his re-
marks, said it was prejudicial, but overruled the objection.
This was assigned as error.
Held.-1. The method of examining a witness is in the
discretion of the trial court even on the question of asking
leading questions unless it clearly appears that the defendant
was thereby denied a fair trial.
2. The remark of the trial court was not reversable




CRIMINAL LAW-SUFFIENCY OF EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS-
No. 12,371-Bowen vs. People-Decided Jan. 27, 1930.
Facts.-Bowen was convicted of the crime of taking in-
decent liberties with the person of a girl ten years of age. He
was sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary.
Held.-The evidence satisfied the jury beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant was guilty. The fact that the
trial judge refused to set aside the verdict and grant a new
trial indicates that his reason and conscience approved the
verdict. In the circumstances we cannot say that the verdict
was unsupported by the evidence.
2. The instruction given by the Court when the jury,
after being out for several hours, failed to reach an agreement,
is approved. This instruction was substantially the same as
one approved in Sevilla v. People, 65 Colo. 437.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEPENDENT CHILDREN-JUVENILE COURT-RIGHTS AS TO
CUSTODY-No. 12,227-Saum v. Freiberg-Decided Feb.
3,1930.
Facts.-Annie Freiberg, maternal grandmother, filed in
the juvenile court a petition declaring that her three grand-
children were dependent on the ground that the mother was
deceased and that the father of said children was not a fit and
proper person to have the custody, care, and control of the
children. The lower court awarded the children to the grand-
mother.
Held.-In dependency cases the welfare of the children is
paramount. As between a grandmother and a father of the
children the custody awarded to the grandmother will prevail
where it appears that the children have a marked aversion to
the father and to his second wife who would share in the cus-
tody if their custody were awarded to the father. The lower
court's finding that the grandmother was a more suitable per-




FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-ACTION TO SET ASIDE-EQUITY
No. 12,498-Roberts, et al. vs. Dietz, et al.-Decided Jan.
6,1930.
Facts.-Dietz brought suit to set aside a Trust Deed given
by Roberts to secure the. payment of certain promissory notes
on the ground that the trust deed was given with the intent
to hinder and delay Dietz in the collection of certain debts
and for the purpose of defrauding him. At the time of the
conveyance, the grantee was a bona fide creditor of the grantor.
Held.-Where the grantee was a bona fide creditor of
the grantor at the time of the conveyance, then the mere fact
that the grantee knows that giving him a preference might or
even would hinder or delay another creditor in the collection
of his claim is not enough to deprive the grantee of his prefer-
ence. The mere fact that the grantee knew that a verdict had
been rendered against the grantor did not charge the grantee
with notice that in giving the trust deed demanded by the
grantee that the grantor was willing or even desired to post-
pone the collection of the judgment. Burden of proof is on
the grantee to show good faith.
Judgment Reversed.
INJUNCTION- BONDHOLDERS- NECESSARY PARTIES- No.
12,250-Denver Land Company v. Moffat Tunnel Improve-
ment District-Decided January 20, 1930.
Facts.-The Denver Land Company brought action to
enjoin Tunnel District and the commissioners from levying
assessments to pay interest on supplemental tunnel bonds on
the ground that the bond issue was illegal and void. None
of the bondholders were made party defendants although at-
torneys for all parties below stipulated that they were not nec-
essary parties.
Held.-Court below was without jurisdiction where none
of the bondholders were made parties in the absence of a
showing why they were not made parties. All bondholders
within the jurisdiction should be made parties, or failing this
a showing be made as to the reason for their non-joinder.
Judgment Reversed with Directions.
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MANDAMUS-TRANSFER OF STOCK CERTIFICATES-No. 12,192
Sturner v. McCandless Investment Company, et al.-De-
cided Jan. 27, 1930.
Facts.-This proceeding presents the question whether in
the circumstances disclosed by the record, Sturner is entitled
to a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the transfer upon
the books of the investment company of 937 shares of capital
stock. In the trial below, McCandless as administrator ten-
dered his verified petition in intervention and applied for
leave to intervene, claiming ownership of the certificates in
question. The Court denied the application to intervene.
Held.-l. In a proper case mandamus will lie to compel
the issuance of stock certificates.
2. However, this is not a proper case because no one
is entitled to a writ of mandamus whose right is not clear and
unquestionable; if there is a doubt about his right, mandamus
will not lie. The fact that a petition of intervention was ten-
dered by a third party claiming ownership shows that plain-
tiff's right and title to the stock was in controversy, and it was
proper to dismiss the proceeding.
Judgment Affirmed.
RES ADJUDICATA-VEXATIOUS SuIT-No. 12,217-London v.
Allison-Decided Jan. 27, 1930.
Facts.-London, plaintiff in error and plaintiff below
seeks to review a judgment of dismissal based upon a plea of
res adjudicata. The complaint was in three counts and charged
that plaintiff was employed by defendant, and in January,
1920, a partnership was formed whereby he was to receive
each year, in addition to his salary, one-fifth of the yearly net
profits; in a second cause of action, he attempted to hold the
defendant as trustee for the amount alleged to be due under
the first cause of action; and the third cause of action was for
the reasonable value of his services. A plea of res adjudicata
was interposed.
Held.-While the former suit might be termed a suit for
an accounting, and the present action is based upon express
agreement, nevertheless the former suit sought to, and did
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adjudicate defendant's rights under the identical agreement
pleaded in the instant case. This is a typical case of res
adjudicata.
The record discloses that this suit was vexatiously insti-
tuted and prosecuted, and plaintiff should therefore pay the
amount of defendant's attorneys' fees, to be taxed as costs, for
the determination of which amount the case will be remanded.
Judgment Affirmed and Case Remanded.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS-TEACHER-BREACH OF CONTRACT-
DAMAGES--No. 12,437-Cheyenne County High School,
Dist. 1, vs. Graves-Decided February 3, 1930.
Facts.-Graves brought this action in the District Court
and obtained judgment against Cheyenne County High School
District 1 on a contract for services as its superintendent of
schools. He prevailed below. The district employed him
at a stated salary for one year commencing Aug. 1, 1925, and
three days later on Aug. 4th, without any charges being filed
or any hearing given Graves, he was discharged.
Held.-l. The findings of the trial Court, that Graves was
discharged by motion carried on Aug. 4th and the keys taken
from him on the 17th of August without any charges having
been filed nor hearing had as required by statute, were sus-
tained by the evidence.
2. The School District could not cure this by a later
meeting and at a purported hearing attempt to ratify the pre-
vious discharge. The School District's breach was committed
on August 4th which marks the date when plaintiff's cause of
action arose.
Judgment Affirmed.
